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COMMONWEALTH v. WILLIAMS: VOLUNTARINESS OF A
CONFESSION AS AFFECTING ADMISSIBILITY INTO
EVIDENCE
Prior to the case of Commonwealth v. Williams' the criterion for the
admissibility of a confession into evidence was its credibility. The voluntary
nature of a confession was only one of the factors to be considered on the
question of credibility. It was felt that a finding by the jury that a confession
was involuntary could be strong evidence that it was not true, and thus, that
it should not be considered as evidence of the guilt of the accused. The
Williams case effects a substantial change in the treatment of confessions in
that, before the members of the jury can consider either the trustworthiness
of a confession or the guilt of the accused, they must determine whether
the confession was voluntary. If they find that it was not voluntary, they
must exclude it from their consideration of the question of guilt, even if
they feel that the confession is true. The purpose of this Case Note is to
examine the rationale behind the Williams decision and to observe the
ramifications which will follow from the practical application of this doctrine
in the criminal trial.
Williams was charged with illegal possession of narcotics. Evidence of
his guilt was limited to two sources, the first of .which was his presence in
the room in which the narcotics were discovered. He was one of seventeen
persons arrested in a police raid of a gambling game. During the raid the;
police found on the floor three envelopes which contained packets of heroin.
Each of the seventeen persons arrested denied having any knowledge of the
heroin. The sole additional evidence of the guilt of Williams was an oral
confession in which he stated that he had been keeping the narcotics for a
friend.
At the trial Williams denied the truth of the statements in his. confession.
He contended a police officer had informed him that none of the' seventeen
persons arrested could get bail until one of them confessed to having possession of the heroin. He also stated that he had been detained overnight, was
unable to report off work, and was unable to let his wife know where he was.
The jury found him guilty of illegal possession of narcotics, and judgment
was entered on the verdict. The court below refused to grant a motion for a
new trial, and the appeal to the superior court followed. The ap'eal alleged
1. 197 Pa. Super. 184, 176 A.2d 911 (1962).
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errors in the charge to the jury, which had been instructed to determine
only whether or not the confession was true. The trial court had instructed
that the voluntary nature of the confession was relevant, but only because
it is unlikely that one would voluntarily make a false confession to a criminal
act. The superior court reversed the conviction and granted a new trial, holding that voluntariness, not trustworthiness, is the test for admissibility. 2 In
so holding, the superior court followed two recent United States Supreme
Court cases, Rogers v. Richmond3 and Culombe v. Connecticut,4 which were
cited as binding authority.
The defendant in Rogers had refused to confess to felony murder until
the police indicated that his wife, who suffered from arthritis, would be
taken into custody. He also claimed that his request for assistance of counsel
had been denied. The trial judge instructed the jury to consider the confession
in their deliberations unless they found that the methods used to obtain the
confession were calculated to procure an untrue statement. The Supreme
Court held that under the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment 5
it was error to apply the standard of credibility rather than voluntariness to
determine admissibility. The truth of a confession is irrelevant as to whether
or not it can be admitted into evidence. The Court also provided an interpretation of the term "voluntary." Although the defendant did not even
suggest that he had been physically forced to make the confession, the
Court decided that the confession could not be considered voluntary unless he
made it of his own free will, i.e., unless he desired to confess.
A murder conviction was reversed in Culombe v. Connecticut after a
state court upheld the conviction of a thirty-three-year-old mental defective
who confessed to the crime after being held by police for five days without
being taken before a magistrate as required by Connecticut law. He was
questioned repeatedly without being informed of his right to remain silent, and
was not given the opportunity to secure counsel. The Supreme Court held
Id. at 195, 176 A.2d at 917. The court stated:
The charge of the trial court in this case was erroneous and inadequate.
It was erroneous in that it applied the test of trustworthiness to the admissibility of a confession, and it was inadequate in that it did not specifically
charge that before considering the confession the jury had to decide whether
or not it was voluntary, or in other words whether or not it was obtained by
constitutionally impermissible methods.
3. 365 U.S. 534 (1961).
4. 367 U.S. 568 (1961).
5. In Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319 (1937), Mr. Justice Cardozo noted that

2.

rights which are guaranteed

under the first eight amendments to the Constitution

(e.g., the right not to be forced to incriminate oneself, under the fifth amendment) are
expressly applicable only to the federal government. However, certain of these rights may
be so fundamental to our system of justice that they are applicable to the states through
the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment. They are rights guaranteed under
due process not because of their presence in any of the first eight amendments, but
because they are considered fundamental rights in our democratic system of government.
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that under these circumstances the confession was involuntary and should not
have been admitted. The power of state courts to promulgate rules of evidence
is limited by the fourteenth amendment, and under Rogers v. Richmond
a confession can be admitted only if it was given voluntarily.
These two cases, Rogers and Culombe, culminate an evolution of the
concept of due process under the fourteenth amendment with respect to the
admission of confessions into evidence in state proceedings. Brown v. Mississippi6 was the first case to invoke the fourteenth amendment as protection
against the reception of confessions. There the prosecution admitted that
the defendants had been whipped and beaten until they were willing to confess
to the crime. These methods were disapproved by the Court, which held
that the admission into evidence of confessions obtained by the use of such
brutal treatment offended due process.
The methods used to obtain the confession in Ashcraft v. Tennessee7
involved a somewhat less violent form of coercion. The petitioner had been
questioned continuously for thirty-six hours without rest or sleep by relays
of officers until he made the incriminating statements. The Court held that
a confession given in these circumstances was coerced and involuntary as a
matter of law. In Watts v. Indiana,8 the Court disapproved the admission
into evidence of a confession which was made after the petitioner had been
held in custody for six days without being taken before a magistrate as
required by an Indiana statute. He had been subjected to long periods of
police interrogation and had not been informed of his constitutional rights to
remain silent and to procure the assistance of counsel. The basis of this
decision was that the due process clause guarantees to persons accused of
crime the right to be tried under an accusatorial rather than an inquisitorial
system. The prosecution must establish its case without the use of a confession
which has been forced from the prisoner. 9 The Court held that the methods
employed by the police were coercive and that the use of a confession obtained
in such a manner was a denial of due process.
The Supreme Court in the cases discussed has looked to the methods
employed by the police to determine whether the confession should have been
admitted. It has applied the objective test of whether the use of these methods
is a denial of due process. As we have seen, Rogers v. Richmond extends the
6. 297 U.S. 278 (1936) ; see Meltzer, Involuntary Confessions: The Allocation of
Responsibility Between Judge and Jury, 21 U. CHi. L. REv. 317 (1954).
7. 322 U.S. 143 (1944), aff'd on rehearing, 327 U.S. 274 (1946).
8. 338 U.S. 49 (1949).
9. But cf. Stein v. New York, 346 U.S. 156 (1953), where a conviction was
affirmed, notwithstanding some evidence that the defendant's confession had been coerced,
because there was sufficient evidence of guilt without the confession. Three justices
dissented on the ground that where a coerced confession has been used the conviction
should be reversed, even though there is other evidence to support the verdict.

DICKINSON LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 67

protection afforded by the due process clause and excludes any confession
which was involuntarily given. The test of admissibility now becomes the
subjective question whether the defendant confessed of his own free will,
rather than the objective test of whether the methods used to obtain the
confession were coercive. The manner in which the accused was treated by
the police is still relevant, but only with respect to the question whether
this treatment induced an involuntary confession. Other circumstances
which may be considered as bearing on this subjective question are: education,
experience with the law, and mentality of the accused ;10 whether the accused
was informed of the seriousness of the charges against him;11 length of
detention ;12 general treatment of the prisoner while in custody;13 promises
made by the police ;14 whether the accused was informed of his constitutional
right to remain silent ;15 whether he was denied permission to see friends ;16
the length of periods of questioning;17 whether there were threats that
relatives would be held in custody ;18 whether he was informed of his right to
counsel and whether his request for counsel was denied.' 9
Prior to Commonwealth v. Williams, Pennsylvania juries had been

instructed to exclude a confession from their deliberations if they found it to
be involuntary. But on closer examination it appears that the purpose for
20
considering voluntariness was to determine whether the confession was true.
10. Fikes v. Alabama, 352 U.S. 191 (1957) (uneducated defendant of low
mentality) ; Culombe v. Connecticut, supra note 4 (mentally defective defendant).
11. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 372 Pa. 266, 93 A.2d 691, cert. denied, 345 U.S.
959 (1953).
12. Watts v. Indiana, supra note 8 (conviction reversed where accused held in
custody for 6 days) ; Turner v. Pennsylvania, 338 U.S. 62 (1949); Commonwealth v.
Shupp, 365 Pa. 439, 75 A.2d 587 (1950). The federal courts have established a rule
providing that a confession cannot be received into evidence unless the accused has
been promptly taken before a committing magistrate as provided in FED. R. CRIM. P.
5(a). McNabb v. United States, 318 U.S. 332 (1942).
13. Fikes v. Alabama, supra note 10; Watts v. Indiana, supra note 8. In Commonwealth v. Spardute, 278 Pa. 37, 122 At. 161 (1923), a conviction of murder was
affirmed where the defendant had been accused of lying, and misrepresentations had
been made to him concerning the evidence against him.
14. Stein v. New York, supra note 9; Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra note 11.
15. Turner v. Pennsylvania, supra note 12; Commonwealth v. Bryant, 367 Pa.
135, 79 A.2d 193, cert. denied, 341 U.S. 954 (1951).
16. McNabb v. United States, supra note 12; Commonwealth v. Shupp, supra
note 12.
17. Fikes v. Alabama, supra note 10 (conviction reversed where there was extensive questioning for 4 days) ; Ashcraft v. Tennessee, supra note 7 (36 hours of
continuous questioning) ; Watts v. Indiana, supra note 8 (extensive questioning for
5 out of 6 days).
18. Rogers v. Richmond, supra note 3; Commonwealth v. Ross, 403 Pa. 358, 169
A.2d 780, cert. denied, 368 U.S. 904 (1961) (police threatened to hold defendant's
friends in custody until he confessed).
19. Commonwealth v. Jones, 341 Pa. 541, 19 A.2d 389 (1941).
20. Commonwealth v. Johnson, supra note 11. On the question of voluntariness, the
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In the case of Commonwealth v. Spardute21 the Pennsylvania Supreme Court
stated that the fact that a confession of murder
was obtained by a trick is no objection to its competence, unless
the circumstances are such as to suggest an inference that through
fear or hope a false confession may be made .

. .

. The object of

evidence is to get at the truth, and a trick which has no tendency to
produce a confession, except one in accordance with the truth, is
always admissible. Society and the criminal are at war, and capture
by surprise, or ambush, or masked battery, is as permissible in one
22
case as in the other.
Although the court said that an involuntary confession should not be admitted
into evidence, it used as the test for admissibility whether or not the confession is true. That Williams effects a substantial change in the admissibility
of confessions can be seen by considering a hypothetical situation where a
confession would be admissible under the earlier test but would not be
admissible under Williams. If the accused made the incriminating statements
after being told by police that he would be placed in solitary confinement until
he confessed, and if the police subsequently discovered evidence which corroborated his statements, the confession would be admissible under the earlier
rule, since the corroborating evidence would substantiate the truth of the
confession. The confession would not be admissible under the Williams test
because of its involuntary nature.
There are, however, practical problems in the area of admissibility of
confessions which the Williams case leaves unresolved. In Williams, the
supreme court recognized that in addition to establishing the tests to be
applied for admissibility it must determine who should apply the tests. After
noting that the states are free to allocate functions between judge and jury,
it specifically authorized trial courts to permit juries to exercise this
function. It thus appears that the prior Pennsylvania practice 23 has been
sanctioned. When the question of voluntariness of a confession arises, it
is the function of the jury to resolve that issue before it considers the question
jury was told to consider whether there was any corroborating evidence which would

confirm the truth of the confession.
"The admissibility of confessions has been adjudged in this state on their evidentiary
trustworthiness according to the circumstances and conditions attending their rendition."
Commonwealth v. Bryant, supra note 15, at 143, 79 A.2d at 197. In Commonwealth v.
Epps, 193 Pa. 512, 44 Atl. 570 (1899), the court stated that an involuntary confession
should not be considered by the jury in its deliberations, but the standard which they
actually set forth to determine admissibility was whether the circumstances indicated a
false confession.
21. Supra note 13.
22. Id. at 47, 122 Atl. at 164. Query, whether a confession obtained by trick would
be considered voluntary under Rogers.
23. See Commonwealth v. Simmons, 361 Pa. 391, 65 A.2d 353, cert. denied, 338
U.S. 862 (1949).
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of guilt. If it finds the confession was given involuntarily it cannot consider
it in determining the guilt of the accused. This is the procedure which has
been utilized in the past, but can it be utilized to effectuate the Williams
doctrine? What standard will the jury use in determining voluntariness?
Will the jurors be capable of disregarding entirely an involuntary confession
which they nevertheless may feel is true?
The superior court has clearly declared that the jury must determine
whether or not a confession was voluntary, but it has not been so clear about
the manner in which the jury is to make this decision, or what standard it
is to apply. At one point it suggests that the test is to be the objective one
of "whether or not it was obtained by constitutionally impermissible
methods. ' 24 Under this standard the jury would presumably look only to
the methods used by the police, and would not be concerned with the actual
state of mind of the accused. However, it also declares that the ultimate
test is subjective: "Is the confession the product of an essentially free and
unconstrained choice by its maker ?"25 When the trial judge is faced with the
problem of instructing the jury as to the standard it is to apply, he receives
little assistance from the standard applied to determine voluntariness in
the past.
In the past, the members of the jury were to look at all the circumstances
of the confession to determine whether a reasonable person would have been
induced to make an untrue statement. If the jury decided that point had been
reached, they were to find the confession involuntary, and it was to be excluded from consideration because it was not reliable. The members of the
jury could easily understand why they should not consider a confession
which was not likely to be true. The jury is now to look at all the circumstances to determine whether a point was reached where a particular defendant
unwillingly made a statement concerning his part in the crime. If he did
make the statement unwillingly it is to be excluded from consideration even
if it was true, because it would be a denial of due process to consider it. It is
suggested that this complicated concept of due process will probably not be
appreciated by the jury, which may be inclined to use the old test in any event.
Under Rogers and Williams, it is essential that the jury not consider an
involuntary confession in its deliberations on the question of guilt. But where
the jury has before it a confession which it has decided was involuntarily
given, but which has been corroborated by additional evidence, can the
members of the jury be expected to exclude that confession from their
deliberations of guilt? Because their function is to determine the guilt of the
24. 197 Pa. Super. at 195, 176 A.2d at 917. See note 2 supra.

25. Id. at 189, 176 A.2d at 914.
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accused, where they have before them a confession which they feel is true, it
would seem impossible for them to fail to consider it, irrespective of voluntariness.
The opinion in Williams does not call for a special verdict. Therefore,
if the case is appealed there are three possible explanations for a finding of
guilt by the jury. It may have found that the confession was involuntary but
there was sufficient additional evidence to establish guilt; it may have found
that the confession was voluntary and based the verdict of guilt upon that
finding; or it may have found the confession to be involuntary but still considered it on the question of guilt. Without the use of a special verdict an
appellate court will have no way to know whether or not the jury based its
decision on inadmissible evidence. This problem was faced by the supreme
court in Commonwealth v. Ross. 26 Its solution was that a finding that the
27
confession was voluntarily given was implicit in the verdict of the jury.
This does not seem a very satisfactory solution of the problem, as it assumes
the question in isstre. It is suggested that, if the jury is to retain the function
of passing on the question of voluntariness, it should be required to render a
special verdict. However, a more satisfactory solution than this could be
reached by making certain changes in the functions of judge and jury.

Under the present system the judge considers the circumstances of the
confession first and if he finds from the incontrovertible testimony that it was
involuntary, he is to withdraw it from the consideration of the jury. If he
finds there is any question of voluntariness, he must submit the issue to the
jury. 28 The judge is not required to have the jury removed from the courtroom while he receives testimony on the question of voluntariness. The result is
that even if he decides the confession was involuntary, the members of the
jury know of its existence and may even know its contents. It might be
argued that it is customary for this procedure to be followed in the course
of the trial in respect of other evidence. But by its nature a confession is
highly prejudicial and would seem to warrant more cautious treatment. It
is suggested that a minimum solution under the present procedure would be
to limit testimony to the circumstances of the confession, thereby not disclosing the contents to the jury until the judge decides to submit the voluntariness issue to it. It would seem preferable to remove the jury from the courtroom while the judge receives the testimony on this issue.
The procedure followed in Massachusetts authorizes the judge to decide
the issue of voluntariness even where there is conflicting testimony as to the
26.
27.
28.
note 15;

Supra note 18.
Id. at 365, 169 A.2d at 784.
Commonwealth v. Williams, supra note 1; Commonwealth v. Bryant, supra
Commonwealth v. Epps, supra note 20.
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facts surrounding the confession. 29 If the judge finds the confession to be
voluntary, he may still allow the members of the jury to consider voluntariness and disregard the confession if they find it to be involuntary. This
method provides safeguards which are not present in the Pennsylvania
system. The judge must find that the confession was voluntary before he can
submit it to the jury, and even then, the jury can reconsider the issue. Where
there are questions of fact present, such as whether the defendant was
beaten or was promised that his wife would not be brought in for questioning
if he confessed, there are two different ways in which these issues could be
handled in Pennsylvania. The judge could be authorized to resolve these
preliminary facts, as under the Massachusetts rule. The alternative would be
to have the jury decide these facts and the judge conclude that on the facts
found the confession is voluntary or involuntary. However, this would present some of the same problems which are present where the jury decides the
issue of voluntariness.
In Rogers v. Richmond, the Supreme Court effected a salutary extension
of due process under the fourteenth amendment. In form, the Pennsylvania
Superior Court has followed that decision in Commonwealth v. Williams.
However, if the Pennsylvania courts are to apply the substantive mandate of
Rogers effectively, they should re-evaluate the functions of judge and jury.
It is submitted that the trial judge must decide whether it would be a
denial of due process to admit a confession into evidence. Only in this way
can real effect be given to the Rogers decision in Pennsylvania.
ILA JEANNE SENSENICH

29.

See Meltzer, supra note 6, at 319.

